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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a brief overview of wireless (WiFi) networks 
and some of the security measures in place today. We further seek 
to find a secure way to authenticate and enable secure 
communication between wireless (WiFi) clients and external 
networks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) has taken the world by storm. WiFi 
provides a means of communicating using ether as the 
communication medium. This proposition of using such a medium 
is very alluring because it is both abundant and cheap. Setting up 
the network is equally easy and the main advantage of such a 
network is the mobility of the WiFi clients.  
The WiFi standard is based on IEEE 802.11 family protocols, 
with the most common protocol used for WiFi being IEEE 
802.11b protocol. WiFi operates on a 2.4GHz1 digital signal, and 
currently the standard maximum speed of WiFi is 11Mbps. There 
are manufacturers offering equipment using a similar protocol but 
operating at higher speeds; this has not yet been made standard 
and is therefore proprietary to the manufacturer of the equipment. 
2. COMMON WIRELESS SETUP 
There are two main ways of setting up a WiFi network. One is 
called “infrastructure” and the other “ad-hoc”.   
2.1 Ad-hoc Setup 
In an “ad-hoc” network, the various WiFi clients (e.g. a laptop 
with a wireless ethernet card) communicate to each other directly, 
in a point-to-point fashion. The ad-hoc network does not require 
any additional hardware for the WiFi clients to communicate 
between themselves.  
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Figure 1: Wireless Ad-Hoc Network  
2.2 Infrastructure Setup 
From the names it is pretty obvious that a network setup as 
“infrastructure” would require some sort of base station (or access 
point) to relay information between the different WiFi clients. A 
WiFi client in range of the base station can communicate with all 
other WiFi clients. 
Figure 2: Wireless Infrastructure Network 
We are mainly concerned with the infrastructure network setup, 
and more specifically accessing of external networks. This is the 
more popular kind of setup, and      
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3. STANDARD SECURITY FEATURES 
There are two main security features that come standard with all 
WiFi networks.  
3.1 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) 
The Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) algorithm is used to protect 
wireless communication from eavesdropping. A secondary 
function of WEP is to prevent unauthorized access to a wireless 
network; this function is not an explicit goal in the 802.11 
standard, but it is frequently considered to be a feature of WEP.  
WEP relies on a secret key that is shared between a wireless client 
and an access point. The secret key is used to encrypt packets 
before they are transmitted, and an integrity check is used to 
ensure that packets are not modified in transit. The standard does 
not discuss how the shared key is established. In practice, most 
installations use a single key that is shared between all mobile 
stations and access points. More sophisticated key management 
techniques can be used to help defend from the attacks we 
describe; however, no commercial system we are aware of 
provides mechanisms to support such techniques. [1]  
3.1.1 Problems With WEP 
WEP uses the RC4 encryption algorithm, which is known as a 
stream cipher. A stream cipher operates by expanding a short key 
into an infinite pseudo-random key stream. The sender XORs the 
key stream with the plaintext to produce ciphertext. The receiver 
has a copy of the same key, and uses it to generate identical key 
stream. XORing the key stream with the ciphertext yields the 
original plaintext.  
This mode of operation makes stream ciphers vulnerable to 
several attacks. If an attacker flips a bit in the ciphertext, then 
upon decryption, the corresponding bit in the plaintext will be 
flipped. Also, if an eavesdropper intercepts two ciphertexts 
encrypted with the same key stream, it is possible to obtain the 
XOR of the two plaintexts. Knowledge of this XOR can enable 
statistical attacks to recover the plaintexts. The statistical attacks 
become increasingly practical as more ciphertexts that use the 
same key stream are known. Once one of the plaintexts becomes 
known, it is trivial to recover all of the others.  
WEP has defenses against both of these attacks. To ensure that a 
packet has not been modified in transit, it uses an Integrity Check 
(IC) field in the packet. To avoid encrypting two ciphertexts with 
the same key stream, an Initialization Vector (IV) is used to 
augment the shared secret key and produce a different RC4 key 
for each packet. The IV is also included in the packet. However, 
both of these measures are implemented incorrectly, resulting in 
poor security.  
The integrity check field is implemented as a CRC-32 checksum, 
which is part of the encrypted payload of the packet. However, 
CRC-32 is linear, which means that it is possible to compute the 
bit difference of two CRCs based on the bit difference of the 
messages over which they are taken. In other words, flipping bit n 
in the message results in a deterministic set of bits in the CRC that 
must be flipped to produce a correct checksum on the modified 
message. Because flipping bits carries through after an RC4 
decryption, this allows the attacker to flip arbitrary bits in an 
encrypted message and correctly adjust the checksum so that the 
resulting message appears valid.  
The initialization vector in WEP is a 24-bit field, which is sent in 
the cleartext part of a message. Such a small space of initialization 
vectors guarantees the reuse of the same key stream. A busy 
access point, which constantly sends 1500 byte packets at 
11Mbps, will exhaust the space of IVs after 
1500*8/(11*10^6)*2^24 = ~18000 seconds, or 5 hours. (The 
amount of time may be even smaller, since many packets are 
smaller than 1500 bytes.) This allows an attacker to collect two 
ciphertexts that are encrypted with the same key stream and 
perform statistical attacks to recover the plaintext. Worse, when 
the same key is used by all mobile stations, there are even more 
chances of IV collision. For example, a common wireless card 
from Lucent resets the IV to 0 each time a card is initialized, and 
increments the IV by 1 with each packet. This means that two 
cards inserted at roughly the same time will provide an abundance 
of IV collisions for an attacker. Worse still, the 802.11 standard 
specifies that changing the IV with each packet is optional. 
3.2 MAC Address Filtering 
As part of the 802.11b standard, every WiFi radio has its unique 
Media Access Control (MAC) number allocated by the 
manufacturer. To increase wireless network security, it is possible 
for an IT manager to program a corporate WiFi access point to 
accept only certain MAC addresses and filter out all others. The 
MAC control table thus created works like "call blocking" on a 
telephone: if a computer with an unknown MAC address tries to 
connect, the access point will not allow it. However, programming 
all the authorized users' MAC addresses into all the company's 
access points can be an arduous task for a large organization and 
can be time consuming — but for the home technology enthusiast 
it can be quite effective.  
It is also possible for a dedicated hacker to "spoof" a MAC 
address, by intercepting valid MAC addresses and then 
programming his or her computer to broadcast using one of those. 
Despite that, for small network installations, using a MAC 
filtering technique can be very effective method to prevent 
unauthorized access. [2]  
3.3 Possible Attacks on Standard Security 
The attacks described below are targeted at WEP. 
3.3.1 Passive Attacks To Decrypt Traffic 
The first attack follows directly from the above observation. A 
passive eavesdropper can intercept all wireless traffic, until an IV 
collision occurs. By XORing two packets that use the same IV, 
the attacker obtains the XOR of the two plaintext messages. The 
resulting XOR can be used to infer data about the contents of the 
two messages. IP traffic is often very predictable and includes a 
lot of redundancy. This redundancy can be used to eliminate many 
possibilities for the contents of messages. Further educated 
guesses about the contents of one or both of the messages can be 
used to statistically reduce the space of possible messages, and in 
some cases it is possible to determine the exact contents.  
When such statistical analysis is inconclusive based on only two 
messages, the attacker can look for more collisions of the same 
IV. With only a small factor in the amount of time necessary, it is 
possible to recover a modest number of messages encrypted with 
the same key stream, and the success rate of statistical analysis 
grows quickly. Once it is possible to recover the entire plaintext 
for one of the messages, the plaintext for all other messages with 
the same IV follows directly, since all the pair wise XORs are 
known.  
An extension to this attack uses a host somewhere on the Internet 
to send traffic from the outside to a host on the wireless network 
installation. The contents of such traffic will be known to the 
attacker, yielding known plaintext. When the attacker intercepts 
the encrypted version of his message sent over 802.11, he will be 
able to decrypt all packets that use the same initialization vector.  
3.3.2 Active Attack to Inject Traffic 
The following attack is also a direct consequence of the problems 
described in the previous section. Suppose an attacker knows the 
exact plaintext for one encrypted message. He can use this 
knowledge to construct correct encrypted packets. The procedure 
involves constructing a new message, calculating the CRC-32, 
and performing bit flips on the original encrypted message to 
change the plaintext to the new message. The basic property is 
that RC4(X) xor X xor Y = RC4(Y). This packet can now be sent 
to the access point or mobile station, and it will be accepted as a 
valid packet.  
A slight modification to this attack makes it much more insidious. 
Even without complete knowledge of the packet, it is possible to 
flip selected bits in a message and successfully adjust the 
encrypted CRC (as described in the previous section), to obtain a 
correct encrypted version of a modified packet. If the attacker has 
partial knowledge of the contents of a packet, he can intercept it 
and perform selective modification on it. For example, it is 
possible to alter commands that are sent to the shell over a telnet 
session, or interactions with a file server.  
3.3.3 Active Attack from Both Ends 
The previous attack can be extended further to decrypt arbitrary 
traffic. In this case, the attacker makes a guess about not the 
contents, but rather the headers of a packet. This information is 
usually quite easy to obtain or guess; in particular, all that is 
necessary to guess is the destination IP address. Armed with this 
knowledge, the attacker can flip appropriate bits to transform the 
destination IP address to send the packet to a machine he controls, 
somewhere in the Internet, and transmit it using a rogue mobile 
station. Most wireless installations have Internet connectivity; the 
packet will be successfully decrypted by the access point and 
forwarded unencrypted through appropriate gateways and routers 
to the attacker's machine, revealing the plaintext. If a guess can be 
made about the TCP headers of the packet, it may even be 
possible to change the destination port on the packet to be port 80, 
which will allow it to be forwarded through most firewalls.  
3.3.4 Table-based Attack 
The small space of possible initialization vectors allows an 
attacker to build a decryption table. Once he learns the plaintext 
for some packet, he can compute the RC4 key stream generated 
by the IV used. This key stream can be used to decrypt all other 
packets that use the same IV. Over time, perhaps using the 
techniques above, the attacker can build up a table of IVs and 
corresponding key streams. This table requires a fairly small 
amount of storage (~15GB); once it is built, the attacker can 
decrypt every packet that is sent over the wireless link.  
4. OPTIONAL SECURITY FEATURES 
The above mentioned methods come standard with all WiFi 
compliant devices. Seeing that they are not all together too secure 
and provide a poor means of authentication, a layered approach 
can be used. Other standard network security methodologies such 
as VPN (to tunnel out of the network), Firewalls (blocking un-
wanted traffic), Kerberos (Authentication), RADIUS (for 
authentication and authorization) just to mention but a few, can be 
used in conjunction with the standard security features (i.e. WEP 
and MAC filtering).  
Even though there are standard security features and additional 
layered security features that can be added to further protect the 
WiFi communication environment, a lot of networks are set up in 
organizations without any sort of security mainly because of the 
amount of work involved in actually setting up the extra features 
(e.g. in the case of MAC filtering setting up each MAC address on 
each access point) and maintaining these extra features. Poor or 
no security “open” wireless networks are popular and a fine art of 
“war driving” is developing in most modern cities that use 
wireless communication in business areas. Currently there is no 
“silver bullet” solution (i.e. simple authentication and to the 
problem of security on wireless networks).  
5. SECURE PROXY APPROACH 
To overcome some of the above mentioned problems, we have 
come up with the secure proxy approach. This approach uses the 
wireless infrastructure network making one modification by 
placing a server between the access point and the outside network.   
 




The server has 2 major roles; (i) to authenticate wireless clients 
onto the network and (ii) encrypt traffic traveling from all the 
clients in un-trusted medium (i.e. air). This setup will work using 
a farm of access points connected together via a hub or switch 
which is also connected to the server (i.e. traffic entering or 
leaving the external network has to pass through this server).  
To achieve this, a client / server model has been created. A client 
module has to be run on all the wireless clients, and a server 
module on the server. The traffic between the client and server 
modules is what is to be encrypted. We decided that only certain 
network services need to be “secured” in this manner and these 
are HTTP, FTP, mail (POP/IMAP/SMTP). These protocols are 
the most popular network services used by wireless clients, yet 
they do not have any inherent security features. Most client 
network applications support HTTP proxies; these applications 
can be run using the secure proxy. If a protocol currently not 
supported is required, an additional proxy could be created for the 
server and client sides and plugged into the respective handlers.  
On the wireless client, the applications using the above mentioned 
protocols will point to a local proxy (i.e. the client module) which 
will accept the traffic, encrypt it using a shared session key and 
send it to the server module. The server module will decrypt the 
traffic and send it to the outside network.  
 
Figure 4: Secure Proxy Overview  
From figure 4, it can be seen that there are handlers on both the 
client and server modules. These handlers are used to control the 
respective modules and proxies.   
Due to the vast number of client machines and platforms at 
present that support WiFi, it would require a very flexible 
programming language to support all these various client 
machines. For this purpose, we are using Sun Microsystems’s 
Java to program both the client and server modules.  
5.1 Security 
As previously stated, the goal is to encrypt network traffic that 
travels in the insecure medium. An encryption module has been 
developed, and it is designed to plug easily into the client and 
sever proxy modules.  
This secure proxy will use two encryption schemes, namely 
public key encryption and shared key (secret key) encryption. The 
public key encryption will be used during the authentication of the 
wireless clients, and also to share the session key. The public key 
algorithm to be used is RSA, which will use 2048bit strength 
keys. The shared key algorithm that will be used is AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard), which a key of 256 bit strength.  
To achieve two way authentication1 the client uses a user name 
and password. The server, however, uses a signed public key. The 
public key of the server is signed by a trusted third party, i.e. that 
both the server and the clients trust. Therefore, during the 
authentication process, the client can verify if the public key is 
indeed from the actual server.  
Once the client starts a session, it gets authenticated by the server 
module. During the authentication process, the client creates a 
special key to be used by that one client for that one session, 
referred to as a shared session key. The conventional encryption 
scheme (AES) uses this shared session key to encrypt the data that 
is flowing to and from the client and server modules.  
DES, Triple-DES (3DES), Blow Fish and Two Fish algorithms 
can be used to produce the shared session key and perform the 
conventional encryption. AES has been used due to its increased 
key strength.  
5.2 Authentication  
These are the steps followed during authentication: 
1. The handlers initially establish a connection.  
2. The server sends its signed public key to the client 
handler 
3. Client handler verifies integrity of public key and 
generates the shared session key2. The client handler 
encrypts the username, and password with the session 
key, and encrypt the session key with the server public 
key. This bundle of information is called the 
authentication code, which is then sent to the sever. 
4. The server will decrypt the authentication code, and get 
the session key. Using the session key it will decrypt the 
username and password information. The server will 
then check if the username and password information is 
valid3. If it is not valid, the server will send a 
termination signal to the client handler and the channel 
is closed, otherwise the server will send an 
acknowledgement encrypted using the session key to 
the client.  
                                                                
1 Client authenticating to the server and vice versa 
2 The key that is just going to be used for this one session 
3 All user information is stored on the server in a plain text file 
Once a client is successfully authenticated, the shared session key 
is used to initialise the proxies.  
This secure proxy approach moves the security layer higher up in 
the OSI network architecture to the application layer. Due to this, 
the main disadvantage will be the efficiency and speed of the 
network communication. However, what is gained is a flexible 
security policy which can be used in conjunction with a variation 
of technologies to enable secure communication.  
As with other forms of security on WiFi, the secure proxy can use 
a layered approach. Perhaps a firewall can be installed on the 
server to handle all the traffic, and the firewall can decide what 
traffic goes onto the external network. Services not supported by 
the secure proxy can be allowed to access the external network.  
6. Problems Encountered 
There have been fairly a large number of problems encountered 
during the progress of this project. The programming language 
used (Java™) has limitations which had to be overcome. For 
example, the standard edition of Java comes with support to 
generate private/public key pair, but does not come with the 
libraries to support the encryption and decryption of data using 
public or private keys. For this, we needed to use a third party 
open source security provider named “Bouncy Castle” [3]. 
Another limitation on the java programming language has been 
the key size for conventional encryption algorithms. Sun provides 
unlimited strength key support policy files which un-locks the 
restriction. This was initially put in place by SUN to restrict the 
export of encryption technologies to certain countries.  
7. LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSION TO 
WORK 
The secure proxy only works for certain network services; there is 
room for extension by adding more proxies. Perhaps creating a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and issuing all the client 
machines with a public/private key pair could enable mutual 
authentication in an ad-hoc WiFi network, and perhaps even 
encrypting network traffic with shared session key.  
8. CONCLUSION 
Wireless networks are inherently insecure. Depending on what 
kind of information is accessed on the network, different security 
measures can be used. As expected, the more layered security 
features used, the more inefficient the network would become. 
The secure proxy solution provides a medium security level. 
Using large key sizes for encryption and hashed message 
authentication codes, intercepting traffic or spoofing traffic will 
prove to be a very tedious task. All current encryption can be 
broken, its just a matter of time. If the time needed to break the 
encryption is greater than the value of the information, then the 
encryption system can be considered secure.[4]  
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